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Abstract 
This article presents a cultural analysis of HBO’s drama series, The Wire.  It is argued 
here that, as a cultural text, The Wire forms a site of both containment and resistance, 
of hegemony and change with recourse to the regulation of illicit drug markets.  In 
this sense The Wire constitutes an important cultural paradigm of drug policy debates, 
one that has significant heuristic implications regarding both the present 
consequences and future directions of illicit drug policy.  Ultimately, it is 
demonstrated below that through its representations of the tensions and antagonisms 
characteristic of drug control systems, The Wire reveals larger predicaments of 
governance faced by neoliberal democracies today. 
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Introduction 
 
Real is pretend, and pretend is real. 
From the autobiography of Felicia ‘Snoop’ Pearson (Pearson and Ritz, 2007).1 
 
Recent years have seen the significant growth of criminological interest in various 
forms of media and their symbolic and textual meanings.  Photographic images 
(Carrabine, 2012), children’s cartoons (Kort-Butler, 2012), video games 
(Groombridge, 2008), and films (O’Brien et al., 2005; Tzanelli et al., 2005; Rafter, 
2007) have all been fruitfully investigated with recourse to the role(s) they play in the 
construction and development of public understandings of crime and justice.  Since 
television programmes are one of the most powerful vehicles driving and informing 
such popular understandings, their inclusion within criminological analysis is not 
only justified, but critically important to the continued development of criminology as 
a field of study.  In this article, following Rafter’s (2007) call for the extended 
exploration of such ‘popular criminologies’, I investigate HBO’s drama series The 
Wire in this light.  
Given that The Wire only concluded in 2008, the level of interest it has generated 
from within various academic disciplines is impressive; its sociological significance 
is now well established (Penfold-Mounce et al., 2011).2  However, with the exception 
of Brown (2007), there has been little sustained cultural criminological engagement 
with its representations of drug markets and drug policy.  Considering the centrality 
of these issues to the show (and the high level of criminological interest in illicit 
drugs), this oversight is surprising.  The present article aims to bridge this void by 
delineating The Wire’s heuristic potential in this context.  
To this end I open with a brief introduction to criminological analysis of popular 
culture which then leads into a discussion of the complexities inherent in the article’s 
starting point; the epistemic and methodological complexities of analysing The Wire 
as a cultural text.  Following that I provide an exposition of existing scholarship on 
The Wire and a brief synopsis of two of the show’s main themes: (1) the unintended 
consequences of contemporary drug policy; and (2), the role of experimental 
alternative systems in drug policy’s future evolution.  The mainstay of the article then 
renders these themes – as they are (re)presented in The Wire – as indicative of the 
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show’s status as a cultural paradigm of drug policy debates.  In this section The Wire 
is presented as a prime example of what Stuart Hall (1981) called the ‘double stake’ 
of popular culture, forming a site of both containment and resistance, of hegemony 
and change, with recourse to the regulation of illicit drug markets.  Finally, I consider 
how The Wire’s depiction of drug policy debates is emblematic of the larger-scale 
contradictions and complexities of neoliberal governance itself.  
 
Criminology, Media and Moving Images 
The relationship between crime and media is one of criminology’s most researched 
subjects (see Carrabine, 2008 and Jewkes, 2011 for excellent overviews).  However, 
it is only relatively recently that the discipline has witnessed what Michael Schudson 
(1987) once called the ‘new validation’ of popular culture in academic study.  If the 
irresolvable debates about media-crime causality can be sidelined for the purposes of 
this article, it is possible to locate the roots of this validation process in the moral 
panic theories of the 1970s (e.g. Cohen, 1972; Young, 1971).  Here sociologists of 
crime and deviance started to pay attention to the ways in which media ‘constructed’ 
crime and criminals.  Important as these studies were, however, it is almost certainly 
the case that the ‘media’ remained conceptually and theoretically ambiguous in them.  
Also, such works were more concerned with crime’s misrepresentation and the 
formation of dominant knowledges than they were with symbolic and/or textual 
meaning. 
However, the ensuing proliferation of entertainment media from the 1980s 
onwards was accompanied by growing academic recognition of their relevance.  For 
Hall (1981), an important step in this process involved accounting for ‘popular 
culture’.  He argued that it was no longer feasible to view culture as ‘monolithic’, as 
an all-encompassing structural entity that simply fed passive consumers ideological 
frameworks of meaning.  Such a conceptual error was evident in the moral panic 
theories that juxtaposed reality and its representation between the actual lives and 
practices of the Mods and Rockers in Cohen’s study, and their representation as 
something else in the media.  For Hall, such a polarisation created and sustained a 
false reality-representation dichotomy.  McRobbie and Thornton reached similar 
conclusions, claiming that: ‘media is no longer something separable from society.  
Social reality is experienced through language, communication and imagery.  Social 
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meanings and social differences are inextricably tied up with representation’ (1995: 
570).  In short, theorists of crime and media increasingly came to recognise the 
boundaries between the two as being irrecoverably blurred.  Representations came to 
be recognised as sites of knowledge in of themselves, as the spaces within which 
contestations of meaning are continually played out. 
Before progressing any further, it is important to assert the critical and generative 
capacity of this blurring.  As Sparks (1992) noted, transcending the simplistic notion 
of televisual representations being the ideological tools of capital means they can be 
recognised as sites where meaning is contested and/or generated too.  They are sites 
where traditional notions of law and order can be challenged, where meaning and 
identification in popular imaginations are far from guaranteed.  O’Brien and 
colleagues (2005) are certainly right when they claim that film: 
 
is not a monolithic site of symbolic interpolation into conventional mores about 
crime.  It is also a space in which law and crime are re-imagined in many different 
ways and in which it is not inevitable that audiences will identify with the law or 
view film narrative through the law. 
(O’Brien et al., 2005: 18 emphases in original)  
 
It is not simply that representations play a role in the maintenance and proliferation of 
a priori knowledge about crime, law and order, but rather, that representations are the 
sites – as they exist in and of themselves – through which knowledge and meaning are 
simultaneously created, maintained, and/or contested. 
Taking the above as her starting point, Rafter (2007) argues the current assortment 
of media representations of crime are best understood through the umbrella concept 
of ‘popular criminology’.  She defines this as ‘a category composed of discourses 
about crime found not only in film but also on the Internet, on television and in 
newspapers, novels and rap music and myth’ (Rafter, 2007: 415).  Rafter’s popular 
criminological project is the investigation of the relationship between representations 
and academic criminology (see also Rafter and Brown, 2011).  Such a view 
recognises alternative ‘ways of knowing, crafting an ‘egalitarian epistemology’ with 
the potential to transcend the disciplinary confines of traditional criminology.  From 
this position, a potentially limitless array of topics can be (and have been) researched 
regarding the ways in which they are culturally represented.  However such variety 
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has also meant that the methods by which such analyses are conducted vary 
considerably. 
In doing research on popular culture there is a subtle yet important epistemic 
distinction that needs to be made between ‘ideological’ and ‘postmodern’ sensibilities 
(Yar, 2010).  Some scholars prioritise the creation and maintenance of hegemonic 
ideologies (e.g. Adorno, 1991), while others adopt postmodern positions that are 
sceptical of efforts to affix or inscribe meaning(s) to any given text (e.g. Young, 
1996).  Such distinctions are evident in the qualitative/quantitative divide within the 
literature on how drug users and dealers are culturally represented (e.g. Boyd, 2002; 
Manning, 2007; McKenna, 2011; Shapiro, 2002; Stephens, 2011; Taylor, 2008).  
Some of these studies adopt a quantitative, ‘content analysis’ approach that delineates 
the ideological and discursive construction of drug users as bad/deviant/sick etc (e.g. 
McKenna, 2011; Taylor, 2008).  And then others take a postmodern qualitative 
approach presenting representations as theory themselves, as cultural texts in their 
own right depicting the conceptual fluidity of notions of, for example, heroin 
addiction (e.g. Stephens, 2011).  Whilst the divergence between these positions may 
be somewhat slim, such distinctions have important implications for the present 
analysis.   
In reading The Wire as a cultural text, the partisan employment of either of these 
epistemic and/or methodological positions becomes problematic.  To treat The Wire 
solely as an ideological conduit renders its viewers little more than passive receptors, 
as well as relieving the show of its capacity to generate meaning.  Yet, to consider it 
devoid of any inherent meaning would miss its compelling challenges to (and support 
for) competing ideologies of drug control.  As such, the task here was to incorporate 
both positions; to adopt a ‘synthetic and critical’ (Yar, 2010: 77) framework through 
which to investigate the show as a cultural product.  The Wire, in short, plays a role in 
ideological construction/maintenance, while also existing as a space through which 
hegemony is challenged and meaning contested.  It is a cultural paradigm of the drug 
policy problematic, a cultural space from within which the key questions of drug 
policy debates are re-appropriated and re-imagined.  As a result, it can be read as a 
potentially unrivalled representation of drug policy dilemmas, of the ‘genuinely hard 
questions’ (MacCoun and Reuter, 2011) surrounding what is to be done about drug 
control.  However before engaging with these matters, The Wire itself requires some 
attention. 
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Reading The Wire 
As noted above, The Wire has generated considerable interest from within various 
academic disciplines.  At a 2008 seminar on The Wire for instance, the sociologist 
William Julius Wilson claimed that it has done more to advance understandings of 
contemporary urban life than any other media representation or scholarly work has, 
ever, including those of social scientists!3  However it is not just Wilson who holds 
The Wire in such high esteem; in drawing attention to the show’s pedagogic potential, 
Kennedy and Shapiro (2012: 10) list nine university courses currently being taught on 
it, while Taylor and Eidson (2012: 281-2) count twenty-one.  Clearly it is not through 
simple ‘fandom’ that Penfold-Mounce and colleagues (2011) designate The Wire a 
form of ‘social science-fiction’. 
This programme is widely regarded as ground breaking, as a show that 
demonstrates just how good broadcast television can be.  Over its five seasons an 
array of writers and producers worked on The Wire under the supervision of its 
MacArthur award-winning creator and executive producer, David Simon, and his 
long-term collaborator Ed Burns.  The former was a journalist with the Baltimore 
Sun, the latter a police detective turned schoolteacher in the same city.  As such, The 
Wire is best considered a work of creative non-fiction, as being equally predicated on 
their collected experiences and imaginations.  Žižek (2011) usefully draws attention 
to this nuanced intersection of imagination and experience, to the complexities of The 
Wire’s ‘realism’ (also, see Jameson, 2010).  It is not so much realist in an objective 
sense, simply presenting objectively realistic material, but subjectively realist in that it 
offers its viewer realistic accounts of the unreal.  That is, of scenarios which have not 
(or could not?) happen, but which do happen – for example, a serial killer being 
fabricated by a reporter and homicide detective; a police chief legalising drugs; or 
two detectives piecing together the sequence of events at a ‘cold case’ murder scene 
using nothing but some photographs, a tape measure, and the word ‘fuck’ (or variants 
of) thirty-eight times in a row.  In this sense The Wire is able to distance itself from 
crude realism yet still foster a status as more than fiction. 
There are numerous ways in which this status is skilfully maintained.  The show’s 
cast is littered with real Baltimore police officers, reporters, drug dealers and 
politicians.  The viewer sees a former mayor of Baltimore, Kurt Schmoke, make two 
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appearances, while one of the city’s former drug king-pins, Melvin Williams, features 
regularly too.  On-location filming frequently features highly symbolic panned views 
of Baltimore’s divided cityscape.  The viewer is regularly presented with life ‘in the 
pit’ – a rundown housing estate – as overshadowed by the affluence of the downtown 
buildings; the opulent roof of Baltimore city hall can be clearly seen from some of the 
most impoverished areas of the city.  Likewise, shots of the Western district’s drug 
corners frequently intersect episode scenes, reinforcing this strong sense of locale.  
As with many of the show’s actors, these are real locations, the actual sites of drug 
dealing, murders, and urban degradation.4  It is through the above that the show 
conveys an authenticity that transcends mere ‘fiction’.  
Such authenticity was of paramount importance to the show’s creators.  For 
Simon, it was about exposing the hypocrisy of the ‘American dream’.  In his most 
definitive account of his motivations surrounding The Wire (in Alvarez, 2010), Simon 
outlines his desire to realistically depict ‘the America left behind’.  It was about 
making clear the adverse consequences of neoliberal capitalism on communities, 
about showing how multiple processes of exclusion operate concomitantly under such 
systems of governance to the advantage of a few and the detriment of many.  It is an 
angry piece of television – ‘The Wire was not merely trying to tell a good story or 
two.  We were very much trying to pick a fight’ (Simon, 2010: 3).  The provocative 
intent on the part of the writers regarding the myths of meritocracy is perhaps most 
evident in the show’s continued references to ‘the game’.  From the drug corners to 
the offices of city hall and the Baltimore police department, ‘the game’ is the quest 
for success, as synonymous with distinction as it is with survival.   
Ultimately The Wire leaves its viewers with little room for manoeuvre here.  The 
show (and its resulting critical reception) gave its creator a platform to shout from 
and he used it to pursue a distinct political agenda.  Failure to recognise this political 
motivation would severely hinder an analysis of the show such as this one: but 
crucially, it is also the case that any meaningful engagement with The Wire as a 
cultural text must ascend over and above authorial intention.  As Barthes concluded, 
reliance upon an author ‘is to impose a limit on that text … to close the writing’ 
(1977: 147).  The Wire is no exception.  A meaningful analysis of it requires 
recognition of its creator’s intent, but must not be restrained by it.  For example, 
considering The Wire solely a polemic against the drug war leaves no room for 
investigating the extent to which it actually achieves this aim.  Not long ago in the 
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UK, then shadow Home Secretary (and the now current Conservative Secretary of 
State for Justice) Chris Grayling made a much-publicised comparison between Moss 
Side in Manchester and The Wire.  He claimed the UK was experiencing The Wire-
like ‘urban warfare’, and that ‘The Wire has become part of real life in our country’.5  
His solution?  A tougher application of law and order policies, more people in prison, 
for longer, under harsher conditions.  This response is hardly congruent with Simon’s 
vision.  It is however indicative of the ways in which this show generates meaning – 
whether it is an academic postulating about its potential to move drug policy debates 
forward, or a politician invoking it negatively whilst electioneering, the process 
remains the same.  
The Wire’s potential to generate meaning is highlighted through the above 
example, and this is precisely why the synthetic and critical epistemology alluded to 
in the previous section is so crucial: meaning must not be inscribed upon The Wire 
(through its creators’ intention or its viewers’ interpretations), yet it must not be 
considered devoid of it either.  In terms of achieving this balance, the show’s ‘more 
than fiction’ status is key; it must be recognised as an already existing cultural 
component of on-going debates about the issues it (re)presents.  The Wire is certainly 
a conduit of pre-existing ideologies, but one where meaning is far from guaranteed – 
it is also a space through which the future shape of debates can be reconfigured.  
Knowledge and meaning are created, contested and/or confirmed by a whole host of 
parties in their reading of The Wire.  It is the above combined that render this 
programme ‘more than’ mere ‘representation’.  Penfold-Mounce at al. forcefully 
argue it ‘is able to provide a social science-fiction; an “inexistent” tale that produces 
a “real being” in a form that inspires the sociological imagination’ (2011: 156 original 
emphasis).  The Wire needs to be understood as more than ‘just’ a realistic TV 
programme; it is transcendental television.  It is a visual embodiment of the 
antagonisms between reality and representation with the capacity to simultaneously 
challenge and/or enhance understandings of the multitude of topics it depicts. 
 
The Wire, Drugs and Drug Policy 
There are many themes that could be gleaned from The Wire for analysis here, but 
two are most pertinent: its representations of street-based heroin and crack cocaine 
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dealing, and ‘Hamsterdam’, an experiment in harm reduction-based market 
regulation.  The following brief synopses are included for the unfamiliar reader.   
 
Drug Dealing in The Wire 
The Wire shows a city where for many people the sale of drugs is a fact of everyday 
life.  It shows the residual aftereffects of prohibitive drug policy; a violent black 
market for heroin and crack cocaine that is aggressively policed.  Most strikingly, the 
drug trade is shown to be thoroughly bound-up with the workings of the city: in one 
form or another, drugs and drug-money transverse Baltimore’s entire social strata.  
Avon Barksdale’s ‘crew’ are engaged in street-level distribution in sophisticated and 
effective ways; Omar Little makes his living ‘rippin’ and runnin’’ (robbing drug 
dealers, see Jacobs (2000) on this); the Union of Stevedores keep the port alive by 
facilitating the passage of drugs into the city; and lawyers, state senators and other 
political figures reap the financial rewards of the trade.  Most frequently though, The 
Wire shows characters like Wallace, Bubbles, and Preston ‘Bodie’ Broadus falling 
victim to the various forms of violence connected to the sale of drugs.  We see, 
counter-intuitively, that drug policy can do more harm than good – the viewer 
witnesses what MacCoun and Reuter (2001) term the ‘unintended consequences of 
prohibition’.  The Wire depicts a core paradox of contemporary drug policy; this 
market only exists in the form it does as a response to the legal arrangements 
implemented to counter it.  Ultimately, The Wire presents a city where the drug trade 
is inextricably bound up with socio-economic marginalisation and political 
corruption; where good and bad, victims and criminals, exist on either side of the law 
in a violent market system. 
 
On ‘Hamsterdam’ 
In addition to the above however, in Season Three, The Wire presents an experiment 
in the reformation of drug policy at the ground level – ‘Hamsterdam’ (a term coined 
by Baltimore’s young drug dealers upon being told that drugs are legal in 
‘Amsterdam’).  Yet in Hamsterdam (much like in Amsterdam!) drugs are not legal.  
Rather, providing certain rules are adhered to, the sale of heroin and crack cocaine is 
temporarily ignored by Baltimore’s police force.  In specified locations a policy of 
non-enforcement was enacted, and measures were introduced with a view to 
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facilitating the market’s self-regulation.  This sequence of events unfolds as Major 
Howard ‘Bunny’ Colvin, disillusioned after the realisation that his thirty years of 
policing West Baltimore have enacted no significant effect upon the drug trade, 
decides the time has come to try something new – to introduce what he terms a 
‘brown paper bag for drugs’.6  The drug dealers in his district are rounded up and 
moved to deserted areas of the city where, under police supervision, they are free to 
ply their trade without fear of arrest.  Eventually however, the Chief of Police 
discovers Hamsterdam and Colvin is ceremoniously sacked.7  Yet, while these ‘free 
zones’ function, crime and anti-social behaviour fall at unprecedented levels, the 
violence associated with the drug trade is significantly reduced, and aid workers are 
able to reach scores of previously hidden/hard to reach populations.  What 
Hamsterdam does – albeit temporarily – is effectively reduce some of the many 
harms that this particular drug market engenders.  In this storyline, The Wire not only 
maps the ‘discursive closings’ of the war on drugs, as Brown (2007) quite rightly 
contends, but it also forms a cultural reference point from within which an alternative 
future direction of drug policy becomes discernable too. 
 
The Wire as a Cultural Paradigm of Drug Policy Debates 
The show’s representations of some drug policy problems, and their possible 
solutions – when considered in tandem with academic discourses on these subjects – 
can be used to substantiate The Wire’s position as a cultural paradigm of drug policy 
debates.  It is to such a task that the remainder of this article is devoted. 
 
The Unintended Consequences of Prohibition in The Wire 
With a few exceptions (e.g. McKeganey, 2011), drug policy analysts tend to believe 
that the current system of prohibition operated at a national and international level is 
ineffective at best, and dangerous and damaging at worst (MacCoun and Reuter, 
2001; Seddon, 2010; Stevens, 2011).  Internationally, barring the numerous historical 
conflicts that brought the system to be (see Courtwright, 2001), drug control is 
reasonably straightforward in that prohibition is dictated by three UN conventions: 
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; The 1972 Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances; and The 1988 Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs.  However at a national level, signatories to these conventions have 
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ample freedom regarding how exactly they implement them.  This is why, for 
example, in Sweden it is a criminal offense to smoke cannabis, in the UK the breach 
of the law is its possession, in Portugal neither is treated as criminal if the amount is 
small, and in the Netherlands it can be bought and consumed in certain cafés. 
Such divergences can be understood by locating national drug policies in their 
respective politico-economic contexts.  For Seddon (2010), the UK’s drug policy is 
best understood in relation to the changing phases of liberal governance – thus, by 
extension, other national drug policies are inextricably bound up with their particular 
governmental contexts too.  In locating the development of prohibition’s substantive 
technologies within the transitions of liberalism, culturally specific implementations 
of the UN conventions can be accounted for.  For example, the neoliberal doctrines of 
individual responsibility and risk-management are strongly embraced in the U.S., thus 
it is home to some of the world’s most aggressive prohibition measures: conversely, 
many European nations have resisted the same adoption of neoliberal socio-economic 
imperatives, and as such, have more tolerant attitudes towards drug control.8  The 
fluidity of prohibition policies has implications for their efficacy as well as their 
impact, both positive and negative.  The Wire makes its first contribution here 
through the ways in which it represents the unintended consequences of these policies 
in relation to drug users’ health, drug market violence, and social exclusion. 
Prohibition necessitates and maintains black markets.  Drug markets are, at their 
most basic level, a response to the socio-legal arrangements instigated to counter 
them.  The Wire neatly depicts the dialectical nature of this process – prohibitive drug 
policy and drug market harms are inextricably linked and mutually constitutive.  The 
programme wastes no time in making this point, in Season One Episode Three (1.3 
hereafter), Stringer Bell exemplifies it whilst giving D’Angelo Barksdale a lesson in 
drug market economics.  As D’Angelo (a lower level dealer) complains about the 
poor quality of the heroin he is being asked to sell, Stringer (his superior) counters 
with the assertion that this does not matter.  He claims, ‘no matter what we call heroin 
it’s gonna get sold.  Shit is strong, we gonna sell it.  Shit is weak, we gonna sell twice 
as much’.  Here, Stringer, (whose copy of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations has 
pride of place on his bookshelf) neatly illustrates an attractive feature of the drug 
trade derived from its illicit nature.  The sale of poor quality produce in drug markets 
is not only harmful to users’ health, but can also result in their need to procure more 
drugs.  If users are reliant upon crime to do this (as many in The Wire are) then the 
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consequences are even wider.  In this vignette The Wire forcefully presents one of 
prohibition’s most pressing unintended consequences: a system created to control a 
market force ultimately ends up strengthening and maintaining said market’s 
commercial viability, and increasing its potential to cause harm in the process. 
Similarly, if the existence of drug markets in their present form is an unintended 
consequence of their regulation, then so too is their associated violence.  There are 
two main variants of drug market violence shown in The Wire: violence perpetrated 
by the police against drug users/dealers, and violence perpetrated by dealers against 
other dealers.  The former hinges on ideology, the latter on culture.  Regarding 
police-perpetrated violence, The Wire directs attention to the early rationale of drug 
control and its ideological basis.  Prohibition was – and in part at least, still is – 
founded on the ideological basis that drug use was ‘wicked’ and would ‘corrupt’ 
individuals.  However, the evolution of prohibition has seen these ideologies 
transcended the substances in question; they are now directed more at users and 
dealers than they are at ‘drugs’ themselves.  This ideological transcendence is key to 
The Wire’s resonance as a cultural paradigm of drug policy debates; the show 
subverts and challenges it through depicting the vulnerabilities of drug dealers to the 
police. 
For example, episode 3.1 sees detective Elis Carver on top of his police car 
screaming at a young drug dealer who has just escaped in a failed bust: ‘you do not 
get to win shit-bird, we do’, he vehemently declares.  He promises to beat the 
youngster if he does not immediately surrender himself, an oath he subsequently 
fulfils. Such violence – depicted frequently in The Wire – has its roots in prohibition’s 
false ideological juxtapositions, in the mythologised notion of a righteous police 
officer fighting a ‘war’ against ‘evil’ drug dealers.  Here violence is initiated, 
legitimised and maintained through the ideological distinctions inherent in prohibition 
praxis. 
However The Wire goes much further than this, it also depicts the ‘cultural 
maintenance’ of drug market violence.  Episode 5.2 sees Detective William ‘Bunk’ 
Moreland claim ‘you can go a long way in this country killing Black folk, young 
males especially’.  His point being (partially at least), that as the people in question 
are mainly involved in the drug trade, they render themselves ‘undeserving victims’, 
semi-complicit in their own fate.  In this example, The Wire reveals drug market 
violence as a response to racial, socio-economic and cultural distinctions.  Omar 
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Little neatly exemplifies this point – he is the ‘honourable thief’, the man who holds-
up drug dealers with a shotgun, yet takes his aunt to church every Sunday morning.  
He is also the only character never to swear.  The viewer is led to respect, admire 
even, his most frequently stated moral imperative – that he would never raise his gun 
to a ‘civilian’ (someone not involved in the drug trade).  Yet, such a code only serves 
to further legitimise the use of violence against those who are engaged in the drugs 
trade.  In The Wire drug market violence is legitimised and maintained within such 
systems through the well developed cultural distinctions drawn between those who 
exist ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of them.  Here the show demonstrates its capacity to 
reconfigure this debate; violence is not just ‘systemic’ of drug markets due to their 
illicit nature (cf. Goldstein, 1985), but a more nuanced phenomenon, primarily 
responsive to sophisticated cultural and ideological distinctions drawn within these 
market spaces, on both sides of the law. 
Finally, The Wire neatly situates the above in the appropriate context of politico-
economic marginalisation and social exclusion.  Political ethics de-politicise their 
holders in The Wire.  As alluded to above, drug control systems are inextricably 
bound up with the development of neoliberalism.  However in this show, so too is 
drug dealing.  The ethics of neoliberalism are thoroughly entrenched in the 
subjectivities displayed throughout the drug crews: from D’Angelo giving speeches 
to his charges about how ‘Mr Ronald McDonald’ reaps the financial rewards from the 
invention of chicken nuggets rather than the inventor who will have been quickly sent 
back to the basement to work on ‘some shit to make the French fries taste better’ 
(episode 1.2); to the infamous ‘King stay the King’ explanation of chess (episode 
1.3);9 right up to Stringer Bell’s undertaking of economics classes at his local college.  
Whilst the show’s drug dealers distance themselves physically and culturally from 
mainstream socio-political systems (just as such systems concomitantly do the same 
to them) they still demonstrate a firm reliance upon individualised, capital 
accumulation-based, market-orientated understandings of their worlds.  In The Wire, 
Baltimore’s drug market takes its current form as a result of the socio-legal 
arrangements initiated to counter it.  However, it also operates through allegiance to 
the very same socio-political systems that underpin the control arrangements.  The 
Wire neatly gets to the core of the issue here – the law responds to the game as the 
game responds to the law.  Crucially, the show is explicit on two points: (1) it 
positions the system of regulation at the very core of the problems posed by drug 
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markets; and (2), it demonstrates the situation as not only self-replicating, but also in 
its current form, as precluding any real chance of significant change.  
 
The Wire and the Future of Drug Policy   
Despite the above it is crucial to recognise the fact that The Wire is not just a 
representation of the problems of prohibitive drug policy, it also has significant 
heuristic potential surrounding possible solutions.  The Wire’s representation of drug 
control is one of contestation; it concomitantly supports, challenges, and reconfigures 
the various positions in this debate.  This contention is returned to below, but as a 
precursor to the ensuing analysis two points must be stressed, firstly the limitations of 
the arguments herein, and secondly the claim that a drug market is a market.  To 
clarify, simply ‘reverse engineering’ solutions to complex social-structural problems 
through representations alone is ontologically unsound.10  The arguments presented 
below are only intended to highlight The Wire’s capacity to frame and reframe the 
debate, rather than end it altogether through the provision of ‘the solution’ per se.  In 
terms of the second caveat, to understand the system of drug sales in The Wire as 
anything but a market is to miss a crucial aspect of its nature.  Undeniably there are 
emotive and transcendental factors resonant, as cultural criminologists would surely 
contend (e.g. Ferrell et al. 2008).  But what The Wire makes clear is the importance of 
conceptualising drug dealing operations as the end components of highly developed, 
responsive and sophisticated market spaces.  Such a conceptualisation is vital.  
Bluntly put, it is the epistemic basis through which the programme’s capacity to shift 
drug policy debates can be realised. 
Others have recognised The Wire’s potential in this respect (Beilenson and 
McGuire, 2012: Ch. 4; Žižek, 2011) yet have failed to follow it through sufficiently.  
It is not simply that ‘free zones’ (as sites where the sale of drugs could be permitted) 
should actually be introduced, or that they would necessarily be effective or even 
desirable.  But rather, that this is the direction in which drug policy debates should be 
heading – that the prohibition-legalisation stalemate can (and must) be transcended 
through the consideration of ‘radical’ alternatives such as this.  Some of the most 
progressive developments in drug policy, theoretically and pragmatically, have come 
from similarly ‘unconventional’ approaches in recent years.  For example, the Swiss 
programme of heroin prescription and supervised consumption facilities came about 
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through the introduction of quasi-free zones in Zurich.  Ultimately, these ‘drug parks’ 
proved untenable and undesirable, but their role in the formation of current Swiss 
policy – in shifting the terms and parameters of the debate – was significant 
(Uchtenhagen 2009).  Furthermore, research on amphetamine-type stimulants in the 
Netherlands is also pertinent.  Through circulating pictures of poor-quality ecstasy 
pills throughout dance venues it was observed that the low-quality products 
disappeared from the market.  As the distribution of better quality (and as such, safer) 
produce became linked to the sellers’ commercial interests, the market reacted in such 
a way that reduced its capacity to cause harm (see Spruit, 2001). 
These are policy interventions that recognise markets as markets, and crucially, as 
being responsive to various strategies of regulation not just the application of the 
criminal law.  There is a strong literature-base supporting such contentions in the 
growing and influential field of regulatory theory (see Black, 2002; Braithwaite, 
2008; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000).  ‘Regulation’ is defined within this paradigm as 
any ‘sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to 
defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified 
outcome or outcomes’ (Black, 2002: 26).  Importantly here, drug policy is nothing if 
not regulation. As such, regulatory theory’s potential in the context of drug policy has 
been noted before (Ritter, 2010; Seddon, 2007, 2010, 2013).  One of the key benefits 
these works sought to highlight is the ability of a regulatory conceptualisation to 
‘broaden the field,’ to recognise the need to think about more than the law when it 
comes to drug policy. 
The Wire too renders this clear, in the absence of large-scale legal changes 
significant effects can be enacted quickly through the manipulation of existing market 
systems to produce less harmful results.  Through Hamsterdam The Wire 
demonstrates the possibilities inherent in a system of governing through over and 
above one of governing against.  This particular storyline strongly resonates with 
cutting-edge social research.  Specifically, with the concept of ‘nodal governance’ 
(see Burris et al., 2005; Wood and Shearing, 2007; Shearing and Froestad, 2010).  
Nodal governance is a model strongly linked to regulatory theory that examines 
power’s operation through governance in complex, networked, social systems.  It is 
‘[a]n elaboration of contemporary network theory that explains how a variety of 
actors operating within social systems interact along networks to govern the systems 
they inhabit’ (Burris et al., 2005: 33).  There are two ontological assertions central to 
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it: (1) that state-centric, ‘top down’, governance is ineffective in networked social 
systems; and (2), in social systems comprised of ‘nodes’ (interlinked points on 
networks that facilitate and influence the transference of power), there will be 
inequalities.  That is, some points (nodes) within networks will demonstrate a 
‘governance deficit’ and lack the cultural, social and economic capital necessary to 
effectively govern their own circumstances (Burris et al., 2005). 
What we see in Hamsterdam is the possible beginnings of an alternative system of 
governance congruent with this conceptualisation.  The Wire reframes questions of 
drug policy here, asking not simply what measures can be put in place to enact 
control over this market?, but rather, what measures can be put in place to enact 
control through this market?  The core premise of Hamsterdam – in a manner very 
similar to that of nodal governance – is that marginalised and excluded populations 
like The Wire’s drug users/dealers can play a significant role in the improved 
governance of their present circumstances, if they are provided with the means to do 
so.  There is empirical evidence to support such a claim, specifically Clifford 
Shearing and colleagues’ work in impoverished areas of South Africa.  Their 
‘Zwelethemba model’ (see Shearing and Froestad, 2010; Wood and Shearing, 2007) 
shows how non-punitive community groups – dispute resolution groups, or 
‘peacemaking’ groups – reduced conflict in their communities by empowering 
disenfranchised populations and reducing their respective governance deficits.  The 
same principle is inherent in Hamsterdam; this is a programme in which a failed and 
harmful system of regulatory governance (the prohibition of drugs) is replaced by an 
alternative system intricately connected to the lives and worlds of the population it 
seeks to govern/regulate.  
As an alternative technology of governance, Hamsterdam harnesses collective 
resources to address collective problems.  For example, aid workers are able to set up 
stations within its boundaries and better coordinate their efforts to address the health 
issues associated with drug use, effectively strengthening this particular ‘node’ within 
the network.  Similarly, in episode 3.2 when it becomes apparent that there are many 
unemployed children in the zones (they are no longer needed as lookouts since the 
market is no longer illicit), Detective Carver initiates a ‘tax’ on the drug crews, 
instructing them that everyone must still be paid, ‘shit is like unemployment 
insurance’ he claims.  Later he uses a similar tax to purchase sports equipment to 
occupy the youngsters.  In these examples, collective resources are combined to 
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address collective problems, neatly representing Braithwaite’s (2008) regulatory 
notion of ‘active responsibility’.  The onus is upon ‘taking responsibility for putting 
things right in the future’, rather than the ‘passive responsibility’ of ‘holding someone 
responsible for what they have done in the past’ (Braithwaite, 2008: 76-77).  
Hamsterdam, in effect, positively responsibilises drug dealers. 
However Hamsterdam is so much more than this.  The Wire does not just critique 
prohibition, or support alternative regulatory arrangements; it redefines the 
parameters of the whole debate producing a cultural representation of the future 
direction of drug policy in the process.  The Wire’s ability to do this, to shift the 
debate, is most evident, paradoxically, through it’s depiction of failure.  Ultimately, 
these interventions do not work, Hamsterdam is disbanded, the sports equipment 
quickly destroyed.  No side really wins.  However a critical reading of Hamsterdam 
offers an alternative interpretation – it was never supposed to ‘work’, it was never 
intended to (re)present the solution to the problem.  Rather, Hamsterdam’s role was to 
recalibrate the terms of the debate, to focus it in a different direction.  To exemplify 
this point take Herc’s disbelief at Carver’s ‘tax’ in Hamsterdam and his snide 
questioning of his partner’s motivations: ‘what are you, a fucking communist?’ 
(episode 3.2).  Crucially, in negatively invoking notions of communism, he directs 
critical attention towards capitalism.  It is through this brief exchange, this single 
nonchalant quip, that The Wire positions itself as the site through which drug policy 
debates can be reconfigured – the core problem of drug market regulation is not just 
the systems and technologies of governance employed, but the political ideologies 
that underpin them. 
The implication here is this – the problems of drug markets cannot be solved with 
recourse to the ideologies of governance that support and maintain their very 
existence.  Just as liberal democratic systems of governance are seemingly incapable 
of restraining the imperatives of capital (Badiou 2012; Žižek, 2008, 2010), so too are 
neoliberal drug control strategies incapable of restraining drug markets which are 
underpinned by identical socio-political principles.  Neoliberalism cannot be 
reformed from within its own discursive and conceptual boundaries, and neither can 
drug policy.  Just as radically divergent systems of governance are required to address 
the destructive nature of capitalism (Badiou 2012; Žižek, 2011), systems of drug 
control also need to be completely re-imagined and re-conceptualised to reduce the 
harm they cause.  True, there are amendments to the regulatory systems employed 
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that can improve things on the ground right now, and they should of course be 
pursued, but ultimately they will not suffice alone.  The Wire makes clear this point in 
its representation of the drug policy problematic – the entire system needs to be re-
evaluated both ideologically and pragmatically.  If drug control is to ever effectively 
eliminate the harms associated with the use and sale of illicit substances, then its 
purpose, principles and methods – that is, its very existence – requires a thorough 
critical interrogation. 
 
Conclusions 
By way of a conclusion I hope this article has gone some way towards strengthening 
the position of cultural analyses such as this within criminology, particularly with 
recourse to television programmes.  Whatever the subject of criminological debates, 
the capacity of televisual representations to challenge and reconfigure them should 
never be underestimated.  In support of this claim this article has positioned The Wire 
at the core of on-going debates about illicit drug policy.  This programme – as a 
cultural text – has been shown to constitute a cultural paradigm of the drug policy 
problematic, one that provides an important visual representation of the many 
tensions and antagonisms inherent in systems of drug control.  Importantly in closing 
though, it must be noted that The Wire has contributions to make far beyond drugs 
and drug policy.  Space precluded a more detailed exploration of the show’s 
treatment of race, gender, sexualities, and childhood for example, yet all of these and 
more are features of The Wire that merit further investigation.11 
The Wire has been shown above to contest the terms of drug policy debates, and in 
so doing, draw attention to some of the larger issues of governance facing the late-
modern world.  While Prez’s claim about the football match from which this article 
gleaned its title, ‘No one wins.  One side just loses more slowly’ (episode 4.4) is a 
pessimistic metaphor for the drug situation, it can also be understood as an invitation 
that is potentially resistant and generative at the same time.  If nobody can win when 
the game is played like this, then we urgently need to change the rules, or better yet, 
play a different game.  In this sense, The Wire resonates with so much more than drug 
policy debates.  Like all great ‘fiction’ it provides a space through which its 
viewers/readers/listeners can begin to think differently about the worlds they inhabit.  
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Bluntly put, regarding drug policy and the larger ordering of our social systems alike, 
The Wire is emblematic of the crucial need for new thinking.   
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Notes 
1. Felicia ‘Snoop’ Pearson played a character modelled on herself in The Wire, a 
ruthless ‘enforcer’ in Marlo Stanfield’s drug ring.  However in ‘real life’, not 
only is Snoop her real name, but she also professed to being involved with the 
sale of drugs whilst filming the show, and she has spent time in prison for 
second degree murder (Pearson and Ritz, 2007).  Part of The Wire’s legend is 
her claim that it ‘saved her’ from this life.  However it seems that the legend 
remains just that – in March 2011 she was arrested on charges of supplying 
heroin and crack cocaine in Baltimore, narrowly escaping imprisonment 
through a guilty plea. 
2. There have been The Wire-themed conferences at universities in the UK and 
the US; special editions of the journals Darkmatter and City (as well as a 
themed section in Criticism); a monograph from Beilenson and McGuire 
(2012); and edited collections from Potter and Marshall (2009) and Kennedy 
and Shapiro (2012).  Other notable contributions have come from Dreier and 
Atlas (2009), Sklansky, (2011), Sheehan and Sweeney (2009), and Ault 
(2013).  Moreover, the debate between Atlas and Dreier (2008), and Chaddah, 
Wilson and Venkatesh (2008) in Dissent Magazine is highly indicative of the 
show’s resonance with numerous pre-existing academic concerns, as too are 
the three responses to Chaddha and Wilson (2011) in Critical Inquiry (see 
Jagoda, 2011; Warren, 2011; Williams, 2011). 
3. The event where Wilson made this claim is viewable online at: 
http://dev.forum-network.org/lecture/wire-compelling-portrayal-american-city 
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4. See http://welcometobaltimorehon.com/the-wire-a-streetview-tour for an 
online ‘walk through’ of the Baltimore streets where the show was filmed.  
5. See http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester- 
news/graylings-comments-on-moss-side-condemned-928267 
6. Following the famous subversion of U.S. liquor laws preventing alcoholic 
beverages being consumed on the streets by concealing them in ‘brown paper 
bags’.   
7. In one of The Wire’s finest moments, Colvin’s last words to his superiors as 
they fire him, ‘get on with it motherfuckers’, are the exact same words used 
by the gang boss Stringer Bell as he is gunned down by Omar Little and 
Brother Mouzone.  Again, ‘the game’ is played on both sides of the law. 
8. However things are changing here – the development of a more ‘collective 
EU voice’ regarding stricter drug control has evolved alongside an increasing 
reliance upon neoliberal economic policies (see Bergeron and Griffiths, 2006). 
9. In this famous scene D’Angelo teaches the young dealers the rules of chess 
through an analogy of the drugs ring that is highly representative of US 
political systems; it is impossible for anyone other than the king to ever 
become the king, and in the game, ‘pawns’ are quickly felled. 
10. Importantly here I recognise the problems depicted in The Wire as being 
rooted in large-scale structural inequalities and as such, as requiring much 
more than just drug policy revision to address.  On this point I am particularly 
indebted to Keith Hayward for steering my thinking. 
11. Investigations that are, to a greater or lesser degree, already underway 
elsewhere.  The interested reader is directed towards Kennedy and Shapiro 
(2012) regarding The Wire and race, and then Ault (2013) for a compelling 
account of The Wire’s representations of African American motherhood, as 
two excellent examples of such work.   
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